Iran After the Midterms: A Long-Term Iranian Victory Could Trigger a Short-Term Escalation

I think we need to distinguish between the short-term and long-term implications of the US midterm elections. In the long run, Iran has achieved a significant strategic success. The blue wave has demonstrated something that every future American president will have to consider before launching another war against Tehran: Iran does not need to defeat the United States militarily to impose enormous economic and political costs on Washington. Disrupting global energy markets, driving up gasoline prices, and increasing the cost of living for ordinary Americans can ultimately have devastating political consequences. Once the new Congress takes office in January, pressure to end the war will increase significantly. Democrats will seek to use congressional oversight and funding restrictions to constrain Trump, although their ability to stop military operations will not be absolute. The political lesson of this war may influence American policy toward Iran for years to come. But in the short term, the situation may actually become more dangerous. Tehran feels strengthened by the election results. It has little incentive to make major concessions, particularly regarding the Strait of Hormuz, frozen Iranian funds, and its ability to export oil. Iran was unwilling to surrender before the elections, and it certainly has no reason to do so now. This leaves Trump with several difficult options. He can walk away without a meaningful agreement, but that would hardly look like victory. He can accept some Iranian demands regarding Hormuz to open the door to nuclear negotiations. Or he can continue the current pressure campaign, hoping Tehran will eventually blink. The problem with the third option is that the current situation is not static. It is an ongoing military confrontation with considerable potential for escalation. Iranian attacks on oil tankers, followed by recurring American strikes inside Iran, create a dangerous cycle of action and retaliation. Every additional night of American attacks increases the possibility of a stronger Iranian response. The potential expansion of attacks against regional energy infrastructure, including the recent strike on the Khor Mor gas field, adds another dimension to this danger.

Meanwhile, the substantial concentration of American military forces in the region raises another possibility: Trump may be preparing for one final escalation, hoping that a powerful strike will either force Iran into an agreement or allow him to declare victory and end the war. But what happens if Iran responds by escalating further rather than surrendering? That is the fundamental question Washington still has not answered. There is also a danger of Iranian miscalculation. Tehran may interpret the Democratic victory as evidence that Trump is increasingly constrained and therefore underestimate his willingness to use military force. At the same time, Trump may believe that one more major strike can restore American leverage without triggering a wider conflict. Both assumptions could prove dangerously wrong. Netanyahu remains another important factor. Although politically weakened, he is still Israel's prime minister and continues to press Trump for additional military action, offering Israeli support for another campaign. He also understands that a change of government in Israel could close this window of opportunity. And this brings us to the central paradox: Iran's political success in the US midterms could actually increase the risk of military escalation before January. The elections may have accelerated the political end of the war, but they have not eliminated the possibility of one final, potentially devastating confrontation. Trump still needs something he can present as victory. Iran will not surrender. And the daily cycle of attacks and retaliation makes it increasingly difficult for either side to control the escalation. The war may be approaching its political end, but its most dangerous military phase could still lie ahead.

Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش

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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش

@citrinowicz

Middle East, National Security and intelligence expert خبير لشؤون الشرق الأوسط وإيران Senior Fellow

@inss_hebrew

Nonresident Fellow

@AtlanticCouncil